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'THE GENERATIONS OF ANTS AND BEAVERS': CLASSICAL
ECONOMICS AND ANIMALS IN THE MILL ON THE FLOSS
By Andrew Lallier
Before any named characters find their way into The Mill on the Floss, the narrator introduces
us to two sets of animals (aside from a human driver): white ducks dipping their heads into the
stream and horses pulling a covered wagon. The ducks are characterized as being 'unmindful
of the awkward appearance they make in the drier world above' (24). This characterization
serves a comic purpose, indicating a disparity between the mentality of the unreflective animals
and the implicit judgement of the narrator's gaze. By contrast, the horses seem to possess a
surprisingly developed interiority (however conditioned by the narrator's 'fancy'), as we hear
of the 'mild reproach' they feel for the driver's unnecessary whipping and their energetic
exertion at being 'so near home'. The horses' very bodies are endowed with interior attributes,
from their 'struggling haunches' to their necks possessing 'patient strength'. These horses even
take precedence over their driver: while the driver is thinking of his dinner, he will first feed
his horses, and the narrator anticipates the horses neighing 'over their hardly earned feed of
corn', but leaves the driver's dinner 'getting sadly dry in the oven'. The implication that the
horses are in the laborious process of earning their feed figures them as economic beings,
driven by the same motivations that drive their driver. In this paper, I will argue that George
Eliot's use of animals in this text, both with reference to motivation and more generally in
connecting human and animal realms, presents a challenge to the conceptions of animals and
the distinctions drawn between animals and humans in classical economics.
Although critics have shown significant interest in economics and animals in relation
to George Eliot, there has been as of yet no major attempt to relate these two fields. Elsie
Michie's 'Horses and Sexual/Social Dominance' probably comes closest to such an attempt,
relating horses in Eliot, Gaskell and Hardy to social class - and more particularly discussing
the disruptive appearance of members of the 'newly enriched' commercial classes on
horseback. Works by J. Hillis Miller on rhetoric and animals in Mill, and by Beryl Gray and
Rosemary Ashton on Natural History in Mill are of particular interest with respect to this paper
and will be returned to later.! I follow the work of critics like Deanna Kreisel and Kathleen
Blake in reading economic import both in the overt content (like Bob Jaken's shipping, Mr
Tulliver's bankruptcy) and the less obvious content (Maggie's romantic plots, narrative
digressions about education). I will also be taking as a starting assumption Dermot Coleman's
argument that Eliot was highly knowledgeable of and engaged in the conflicts of classical
economics, both from direct familiarity with the works of political economists as well as
through her work with The Westminster Review.' Before turning to Eliot's engagement with
animals in The Mill on the Floss, I want to sketch out a brief account of animals in classical
economics, as an important background for understanding this engagement.
In the second chapter of the first book of An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith speaks of a 'certain propensity in human nature ... to truck,
barter, and exchange one thing for another' which is 'common to all men, and [is] to be found
in no other race of animals' (20). This peculiar propensity in turn brings about the division of
labour, and thus permits the emergence of a distinctive human economy and engenders a
progressive tendency in this economy to increase production. The distinction of the human
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from other animals is nothing new - the move certainly precedes Aristotle's political (or
rational) animal and Plato's jesting non-distinction of the featherless biped - but it takes on a
particular importance in the development of political economy in Britain. If political economy
were to draw no fundamental distinction between the human and other animals and at the same
time the laws of political economy were to govern collective human behaviour, then a troubling
implication would be that there were no significant and practically manifest difference between
the human and other animals. Because humans possess a differentiating propensity to engage
in the formative economic activity of trade, which may, Smith speculates, in turn be derived
from human faculties of speech and reason, we can put confidence in the general project of
political economy as something which will ultimately accord with human needs and
aspirations. At the same time, this differentiation seems to devalue animals: Smith calls cattle
and poultry 'unmanufactured commodities', while even animals that contribute labour are at
most 'instruments of husbandry' (179, 73). Although the second chapter considers dogs as
animals that can engage us emotionally, more attention is given to animals considered as
instruments, and far more attention to animals treated as commodities - particularly cattle (the
most frequently referenced animal in Wealth of Nations), poultry and swine, as well as game
and animals hunted for fur. This economic understanding of animals is shared by Ricardo, who
treats them primarily as a kind of embodied exchange value in his On the Principles of Political
Economy and Taxation.
Smith is not, however, entirely consistent in differentiating between humans as rational
economic agents and animals as commodities. Smith compares 'the uniform, constant and
uninterrupted effort of every man' to better his condition with 'the unknown principle of animal
life,' both apparently related to a 'natural progress of things towards improvement' (114). A
similar triple connection occurs in agriculture where 'labouring servants', 'labouring cattle'
and nature itself labour together - although, perhaps tellingly, only the farmer who hires this
labour is described as putting it to work (135). At least in one major respect, human populations
seem to behave like animal populations: 'As men, like all other animals, naturally multiply in
proportion to the means of their subsistence, food is always, more or less, in demand' (218).3
Exactly how close Smith is here to Malthus's infamous position not entirely clear - his
often optimistic tone suggests distance, but Smith does not here spell out what it is that keeps
human popu1ations in line with their subsistence. In the opening chapter of his Essay on the
Principle of Population, Malthus is careful to draw a more careful distinction than Smith on
this point: 'in plants and irrational animals' population dynamics are 'simple', increasing until
checked by 'want of nourishment'. Humans are also powerfully driven by a powerful drive but
may also listen to reason, which encourages them not to increase beyond their available supply.
Although following reason 'too frequently results in vice', the results of not doing so are
human misery and death (Malthus I, 3). Despite this opening gesture towards an exceptional
human rationality, this rationality seems incapable of changing the human population's animallike tendency to increase beyond its means of sustenance (although a great number of other
mediate checks precede the ultimate check of want of food in limiting human populations).
Although Malthus insists that humans have available to them something beyond the 'dictates
of nature' given to animals and can act 'as reasonable beings', it is not at all clear that this
availability modifies their behaviour.
As Mill seeks to recover a more holistic conception of political economy from Smith,
he also seems to inherit Smith's interest in animals, as well as some of Malthus's anxiety about
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population. In Mill's Principles of Political Economy with some of their Applications to Social
Philosophy, animals do function as commodities (again, particularly cattle), but they also play
a crucial role in labour and the 'domestication of the more useful animals' serves to distinguish
the first major step in human civilization (I, 33, 12): Like Malthus, Mill is quick to insist that
the human possesses motivations beyond 'mere animal instinct', but Mill seems more sanguine
concerning the possible efficacy of these motivations than his predecessor (191). Combating
what he sees as a tendency to view poverty as inevitable according to the laws of political
economy (a view easily adduced from the work of Malthus and Ricardo), Mill counters:
'Poverty, like most social evils, exists because men follow their brute instincts without due
consideration .... But society is possible, precisely because man is not necessarily a brute.
Civilization in every one of its aspect is a struggle against the animal instincts' (445-6). This
struggle against the animal or brute instincts marks the essential 'step out of the merely animal
state into the human' (334). This step is not, however, irreversible. Hypothesizing a state in
which all economic checks to population were removed, Mill declares that support of the poor
would come to take up the entire production of a country, at which moment the population
checks of 'death or prudence' would 'come into operation suddenly and at once; everything
which places mankind above a nest of ants or a colony of beavers, having perished in the
interval' (434).
In the transition from political economy to economics that developed in the second half
of the nineteenth century, Mill's attempt at a holistic model would be replaced by a
systematically and mathematically grounded model, shaped by impulses more akin to those
guiding Ricardo's work (though discarding the labour theory of value advocated by both
Ricardo and Mill). As political economy develops an increasingly abstracted and mathematical
character, it becomes ever more necessary to secure a core of predictable rationality in
humanity that will govern its behaviour and conform to a given set of laws. At the same time,
the manifest anxieties concerning the distinctions between the human and the animal found in
Malthus and Smith seem to disappear from view. In his Theory of Political Economy, William
Stanley Jevons does draw a distinction between the human and the animal, designating 'the
lower wants' as common to both 'man' and 'brutes,' while reserving a sphere of secondary
desires for the human (50-1); but this distinction does not appear, as Smith's propensity for
trade, at the foundational beginning of the text - and it seems to require no particular
elaboration as regards animals. As in Ricardo, the animals that appear in Jevons's work are
few in number and primarily present as food to be bought and sold.
Although George Eliot would not meet Jevons until well after The Mill on the Floss
was published, she was directly familiar with the works of both Smith and Mill, and served as
editor to the Westminster Review in midst of the journal's long tradition of the defence of
classical economics and more particularly as the legacies of Ricardo's thought were being
developed (Coleman, 23-8). As Catherine Gallagher notes, her acquaintance with Malthus's
ideas is only enigmatically attested to in her journal, but is apparent from her earliest fiction
(174-5). In this context, Eliot's extensive references to animals in a novel centrally concerned
with economic activity and status can be read as a commentary of sorts on the development of
political economy. Eliot's attention to working animals such as horses and dogs, and her
interest in their subjective interiorities, bespeaks a challenge to the tendency in political
economy to reduce animals to commodities.' However, in this paper, I will be focusing
primarily on the instinctual, animal-like economic behaviour of characters in the novel and
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narratorial challenges to human/animal distinctions, particularly on the level of societies or
populations. 6 In attacking the kinds of distinctions political economists drew between the
human and the animal, Eliot is in part realizing the anxieties of Mill and Malthus, and
recognizing the limits of civilized rationality. But we might also think of Eliot as resisting the
Ricardian impulse to render political economy an abstract and mathematically-reducible
systematic undertaking, and as taking Mill's Smithian project of a more holistic political
economy further than either Mill or Smith could.'
Tom Tulliver and Bob Jakin present the reader with two opposed narratives of personal
economic development and animals, which illustrate the dangers of an excessive abstraction of
the human from the animal. Both boys begin the story with an intense, often antagonistic and
sometimes deadly, relationship with the animals around them. Bob has a relatively complex
view of animals, seeing them variously as prey for economic gain (being involved in bird
frightening and interested in rat-catching), potential helpers in economic activity (ferrets and
dogs) and sources of entertainment. Although Tom shares this last view, his primary
understanding of animals is as economic status symbols - seeing his father's 'capital black
mare - as pretty a bit of horse-flesh as ever you saw' as proof of his standing and dreaming of
becoming a young gentleman with the natural 'accoutrements' of horses and dogs (60-2, 136,
187,217). As Tom advances in trade, he seems to abandon this previous interest in animals, a
development that coincides with his increasing suppression of impulses and instincts irrelevant
to business. Bob meanwhile gives up his dreams of rat-catching, but successfully sublimates
his animal desire to hunt animals into his profession as a packman, continuing his 'sport' with
'haggling women' and seeing Mrs Glegg as 'a bit of game worth running down' (267-8, 295).
Bob also maintains other animal connections, following Maggie with the 'gaze of an intelligent
dumb animal', and maintaining a close personal and economic relation to his dog Mumps
(229).8 While Bob manages to maintain strong connections both to business and his emotional
domestic life (being also a good Malthusian and waiting to get a wife until his monetary
situation warrants doing so), Tom's economic development seems to entail deprivation of
personal and emotional connections.
In discussing Tom and Maggie, the narrator seems to posit animal impulse as a stage
humans outgrow: 'We learn to restrain ourselves as we get older.... We no longer approximate
in our behaviour to the mere impulsiveness of the lower animals, but conduct ourselves in
every respect like members of a highly civilized society' (52). However, the lengthiest
comparisons of humans and animals in this novel are directed at the unequivocal adults Mrs
Tulliver and Mr Stelling, and an animal-like 'mere impulsiveness' seems to govern the social
and economic behaviour of the inhabitants of St Oggs. Like Tom as a shrewmouse or Bob as
intelligent dumb beast, most characters in this novel get by, particularly their economic actions,
without any apparent surplus of reflection or comprehensiori.
We might think of Mrs Tulliver and Wakem as representing different ends of this
instinctual-animal spectrum. Mrs Tulliver is compared to 'a patriarchal gold-fish' on account
of her apparent imperviousness to experience (85) - an imperviousness which causes her
inadvertently to encourage her husband to damage her family's economic situation by paying
back a loan from Mrs Glegg. Later imagined as a hen in the chapter 'How a Hen Takes to
Strategem', Mrs Tulliver attempts reflection, but without any better result: 'Imagine a truly
respectable and amiable hen ... taking to reflection and inventing combinations by which she
might prevail on Hodge not to wring her neck, or send her chicks to market: the result could
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hardly be other than much cackling and fluttering' (234). Unlike the hen, however, Mrs Tulliver
actually manages to bring about a misfortune on her family not previously contemplated by her
oppressor. If Mrs Tulliver's instinctual unreflectiveness acts to her economic disadvantage,
Wakem seems possessed of animal instinct much better fitted to economic benefit. Wakem is
not stymied by the kind of conflicts that paralyze characters like Maggie and Dr Kenn, but
instead possesses 'motives [that] run in fixed tracks' (239). Although Wakem is certainly
rational, his economic activity is figured in animal terms, early on being 'sure of his game' and
after the meeting with Mrs Tulliver being compared to a pike (157, 239). Taking Mr Tulliver
as a roach and Wakem as a pike, the narrator remarks that the 'roach naturally abhors the mode
in which the pike gets his living, and the pike is likely to think nothing further of even the most
indignant roach than that he is excellent good eating' (239-40). The two senses of 'gets his
living' coalesce here, and Wakem's economic activity is imagined as a kind of animal
devouring of persons and property.' Although Wakem has rational reasons for his acquisition,
it is not at all clear that he is not rationalizing a motive that is based more in resentment than
calculation. Wakem's pleased contemplation of humiliating Tulliver and his desire 'to
predominate over' Guest and Deane suggest that for Wakem, no less than Tulliver,
'predominance' may form an animal 'law of life' which directs and determines his economic
and social behaviour (241, 192).
Although the most overt specimen of animal instinct among the Dodsons and Tullivers,
Mr Tulliver is hardly alone as a creature whose instincts affect him economically. Mr Tulliver's
instinct to go 'lawing' is given no rationale except the above-mentioned need to predominate
(and presumably a correspondent sensitiveness to perceived threats to this need) and Wakem's
characterization of him as a 'furious bull' seems confirmed by Tulliver's animal response to
Wakem, once freed from his economic bonds to the lawyer. 10 That the Dodson sisters and their
husbands are more successful than the unfortunate Bessy and Edward seems to be less a
function of some rational surplus than a different set of animal instincts or habits." Mr Glegg
accumulates his wealth slowly, 'as the tracking of the fox belongs to the harrier' and following
'the inalienable habit of saving' (p. 127). Mrs Glegg seems guided by a similar drive to saving
and thrift, as exploited by Bob and resulting in a wide range of behaviour satirically described
by the narrator in her as well as her sisters. Once engaged in talking about professional
advancement, Mr Deane easily detaches himself from the particular circumstances before him
(e.g., Tom's wanting a job) in indulging a 'tendency to repress youthful hopes' and an instinct
to reminisce (220-1).
The best known junction of instinct and profession is embodied in Mr Stelling's
beaver-like approach to education, which, like Mr Deane's discourse, proceeds with a
'uniformity of method and independence of circumstances' (140). As J. Hillis Miller has
thoroughly analyzed the metaphoric acrobatics Mr Stelling's educational method sets off in the
narrator, and Rosemary Ashton has analyzed the scientific analogy at work in Mr Stelling's
comparison with Binny the beaver, I will content myself with noting that Mr Stelling engages
in teaching Tom grammar and Euclid with the 'same unerring instinct of the beaver' and taking
note of some of the narrator's comments shortly after the famous passage analyzed by Miller
(Miller, 61-8; Ashton, 32-33; Eliot, 143) Mr Stelling's discourse is guided by an animal-like
instinct, but is itself primarily devoid of animals, consisting in grammar and logical
mathematics - the animals Miller takes up, the beaver, the camel and the shrewmouse are all
imposed by the narrator. Tom, by contrast, identifies Latin as 'beastly stuff' (143). Although
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Tom's complaint does not appear to refer consciously to animals, before taking a plunge into
metaphorical fields, stomachs, and paper the narrator defends Tom's practical and animal
knowledge (particularly of dogs and horses) against Stelling's more abstract claims (142). We
might here also think of Maggie's despairing inability to connect Aldrich's logic with the
'living world' around her, including its animal inhabitants (p. 270). In place of Mr Stelling's
instinctual belief in Latin for its own sake, the narrator imagines another basis for the language,
speaking of Tom's unawareness that there were once 'people who bought and sold sheep and
oxen, and transacted the everyday affairs of life, through the medium of this language'. The
narrator mayor may not share a hypothetical Tom's suspicion about the need to learn Latin
'when its connection with those affairs had become entirely latent', but it is clear that the
narrator is interested in unearthing a historical basis for the language in human economic
activity, and connecting this activity to animals (143).
The image of animals at market is invoked in quite a different context by Mr Tulliver
towards the beginning of the novel, when he reflects with mild lament that Maggie's
intelligence makes her 'no better nor a long-tailed sheep - she'll fetch none the bigger price for
that' (28). A similar anxiety surfaces once Maggie has acquired qualities more desirable on the
marriage market (a submissive 'good' -ness and an attractive appearance) that she will 'be
thrown away' due to her loss of economic status. Philip attributes a similar attitude concerning
animal fitness in match-making to his fellow citizens, objecting to his Father: 'Find a single
person in St Ogg's who will not tell you that a beautiful creature like her would be throwing
herself away on a pitiable object like me' (392). Philip's hypothesis seems confirmed by the
reaction of St Ogg's to Maggie before her elopement. In this light, Stephen Guest's decision to
pursue Maggie can be seen not solely as a passionate violation of social norms (as we are
encouraged to think of it), but as a recognition of certain values already established in a wider
market, proceeding in the violation of some customs. The narrator describes Stephen's selfappeal to avoid Maggie with a reference to his half-engagement to Lucy, 'the dearest little
creature in the world', and the narrator explicitly confirms Stephen's judgement that Lucy
would make a good wife with reference to Lucy's kindness to her domestic animals (352, 342).
But Maggie is also figured as a desirable creature: 'To see such a creature subdued by love for
one would be a lot worth having - to another man' (377). While ineffectively concealing
personal desire, Stephen's appeal to 'another man' affirms the social market value Maggie
holds as an animal to be possessed. Maggie's appeal to an incalculable value inherent in the
moral debts we hold to other humans can be thought of as a kind of resistance, not only to a
logic that would reduce human relations to abstract economic relations, but also to the
economical calculus of passion proposed by Stephen.
We should not forget that Maggie herself is a story-teller in this narrative, and extends
humanlike sociality and behaviour to the insects around her, creating worlds in which spider
families bicker over how best to serve their flies and earwigs go in search of the doctor when
injuries befall their children (43, 105). The scientifically-minded narrator may not share
Maggie's wide speculations, but does imagine the town of St Oggs itself 'as a continuation and
outgrowth of nature, as much as the nests of the bower-birds or the winding galleries of the
white ants' (121). For a novel that manifests an interest in connecting humans, animals and
economics, there would have hardly been a more compelling animal to choose at this point in
the nineteenth-century than ants. In 1853 eighth volume of the eighth edition of the
Encyclopcedia Britannica, much attention is given to the 'economy and domestic policy of
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these remarkable creatures' (III. 261). Ants, by this account, possess a labour force and army,
draw from a variety of food supplies (including milking domesticated aphids), construct
elaborate dwelling spaces and some species even participate in a 'slave trade' (262-6). Many
of these same features of ants would later be referenced by Darwin in The Descent of Man as
an argument against man being placed in a separate kingdom from the animals (147).
Throughout the Mill, the narrator offers several possible distinctions between humans
and animals, none of which seem to do the kind of work desired by the distinctions of political
economists. Maggie is described as 'gifted with that superior power of misery which
distinguishes the human being, and places him at a proud distance from the most melancholy
chimpanzee' (59). Misery, however, is precisely the alternative to vice that results when human
populations behave like animal populations and exceed their food supply, according to
Malthus. A more positive distinction is later offered in that 'striving after something better and
better in our surroundings, the grand characteristic that distinguishes man from the brute' (154).
Despite the optimistic Smithian tone of this distinction, the narrator immediately undermines
this tone by rendering this a distinction made within humanity with imperial overtones, and
then placing greater value in an emotional attachment to the world in which we grow up.
Finally, the narrator offers up Bob's thumb as a 'specimen of that difference between the man
and the monkey' (267). The 'proud distance' between the human and the animals rests not in
some rational surplus or tendency to improvement or civilization, but in a simple fluke of
physiology.
Discarding the distinctions of political economy, The Mill on the Floss alternates
between Maggie's speculative joy and interest in animals and their connections with our world,
economic and otherwise, and a narrative anxiety about our animal-like unreflective behaviour,
which can threaten economic well-being, but also threatens us with the prospect that our
society produces nothing more than the' generations of ants and beavers' (256). It is consistent,
however, in its expression of a need to include animals in the literary and economic stories we
tell, and its suspicion of any abstract logical or mathematical narrative that would claim to
describe human society while effacing both positive and negative aspects of our animal
irrationality and the roles that animals play in our cultures and imagination.
Notes
For more work on Eliot and animals, see Gray's 'George Eliot, George Henry Lewes,
and Dogs', The George Eliot Review 33 (2002), pp. 51-63; Brenda Ayers-Ricker,
'Dogs in George Eliot's Adam Bede', George Eliot - George Henry Lewes Newsletter
18-19 (Sept 1991), pp. 22-30; Mary Jean Corbett, "The Crossing 0' Breeds" in The
Mill on the Floss' in Victorian Animal Dreams: Representations ofAnimals in Victorian
Literature and Culture, eds Deborah Morse and Martin Danahay (Aldershot, U K:
Ashgate, 2007), pp. 121-144; Shifra Hochberg, 'Animals in Daniel Deronda:
Representation, Darwinian Discourse, and the Politics of Gender', George Eliot George Henry Lewes Studies 30-31 (Sept 1996), pp. 1-19; and Linda K. Robertson,
'Horses and Hounds: The Importance of Animals in The Mill on the Floss', The George
Eliot Review 26 (1995), pp. 61-3.
2

Work has also been done connecting Eliot's novels to the work of particular classical
economists, particularly Smith and Malthus. For some examples of this work, see Rae
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Greiner's 'Sympathy Time: Adam Smith, George Eliot and the Realist Novel',
Narrative 17.3 (Oct 2009), pp. 291-311; Imraan Coovadia, 'George Eliot's Realism
and Adam Smith', SEL: Studies in English Literature 1500-190042.4 (Autumn 2002),
pp. 819-835; Catherine Gallagher's chapter on Eliot in The Body Economic (referenced
in the Bibliography) and Lana Dalley's 'The Economics of "A Bit 0' Victual", or
Malthus and Mothers in Adam Bede', Victorian Literature and Culture 36 (2008), pp.
549-567.
3

For a reading of Smith's somewhat different account of animals in his Theory of Moral
Sentiments, see Alejandra Mancilla's 'Nonhuman Animals in Adam Smith's Moral
Theory', Between the Species 9 (August 2009), <http://cla.calpoly.edu/bts/>.

4

Mill even goes so far as to argue that the protection of the 'lower animals' from cruelty
falls within the proper scope of government, by analogy with the protection of children
(ll, p. 546).

5

Beryl Gray has drawn particular attention to the developed interiorities of dogs in this
novel- see 'Animated', 145.

6

Many of the passages I cite in the rest of this paper have been previously cited by critics
like Beryl Gray and Linda K. Robertson (among others). In returning to these passages,
however, I wish to emphasize the hitherto neglected economic dimensions at work in
these animal figurations and comparisons.

7

For a discussion of the development of political economy from Smith to Jevons that
traces these competing impulses towards holism and mathematical system, see Claudia
C. Klaver's NMoral Economics: Classical Political Economy and Cultural Authority
in Nineteenth-Century England (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2003).

8

Although this requires some hypothesizing, I would argue that Mumps most probably
serves as a kind of guard dog for Bob, besides being an emotional companion.

9

As Beryl Gray points out, this metaphor of eating (and the threat of choking) is also
used by Wakem himself in talking about Tom (,Animated', 154).

10

On the point of the novel's presentation of Mr Tulliver's instinct or impulse to go
'lawing', see Law, p. 58.

11

For an extensive account of habit in this text, see Kristie M. AlIen's 'Habit in George
Eliot's The Mill on the Floss', SEL 50.4 (Autumn 2010), pp. 831-852.
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